Chapter

Resolution of Six Difficulties for a Mathematicist Account of Judicial Proof

L. Jonathan Cohen

in The Probable and The Provable

Published in print December 1977 | ISBN: 9780198244127
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680748 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244127.003.0020

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

Resolution of Six Difficulties for a Mathematicist Account of Judicial Proof

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This chapter shows the resolution of six difficulties for a mathematicist account of judicial proof. It first reports the difficulty about conjunction. It also addresses the difficulty about inference. The non-complementational negation principle for inductive probability ensures that, on an inductivist account, the standard of proof in civil cases does not officially condone a positive probability of injustice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof at the level of inductive certainty. The inductivist analysis elucidates why ordinary juries are competent to assess judicial proofs. Moreover, convergence and corroboration, and their appropriate independence conditions, can be readily explained in terms of inductive probability, with no difficulty arising about prior probabilities.

Keywords: judicial proof; conjunction; inference; negation principle; inductive probability; inductivist analysis; convergence; corroboration

Chapter.  6603 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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