Chapter

Criteria of Rational Belief

L. Jonathan Cohen

in The Probable and The Provable

Published in print December 1977 | ISBN: 9780198244127
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680748 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244127.003.0023

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

Criteria of Rational Belief

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This chapter begins by providing the problem of the detachment conditions for dyadic judgements of probability. The study of criteria for rational belief is very largely the study of the detachment conditions for dyadic judgements of probability. The deductive closure condition and the logical consistency condition present difficulties for any acceptance-rule formulated in terms of mathematical probability. The proposals for dealing with these difficulties that have been put forward by Hintikka and Hilpinen, by Kyburg, by Levi, and by Lehrer, are all, for different reasons, unsatisfactory. But a rule of acceptance formulated in terms of inductive probability does not encounter any of these difficulties. Mathematical probability can provide a basis for decision-theoretic strategies, but not for rational belief.

Keywords: rational belief; mathematical probability; detachment conditions; dyadic judgements; deductive closure condition; logical consistency condition; inductive probability; acceptance-rule

Chapter.  5423 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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