Chapter

Class

George Bealer

in Quality and Concept

Published in print May 1982 | ISBN: 9780198244288
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680762 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244288.003.0006

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

Class

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This chapter argues that set theory — unlike the theory of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs) — is not rooted in natural logic but is instead born of certain confusions about natural logic. It shows that everything that set theory can do can be done equally well by the theory of PRPs. It concludes that there is no good logical or pragmatic reason for set theory. This shows that entities grounded in natural logic namely, ordinary aggregates and their properties, may permanently take over the functions that were served on an ad hoc basis by the artificial abstract aggregates of set theory.

Keywords: set theory; properties; relations; propositions; natural logic

Chapter.  7211 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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