Chiefly on Statements of Logical Probability


in Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism

Published in print April 1973 | ISBN: 9780198245018
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680823 | DOI:
Chiefly on Statements of Logical Probability

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This chapter discusses the statements of logical probability. It first introduces the principles and statements of probability. The relation which exists between statements, and the principles, of probability can best be made clear by an analogy with two kinds of propositions in geometry. There are two different senses of ‘probability’, a factual one and a logical one. These two probabilities are described here. In addition, the chapter outlines the kinds of statements of logical probability. The statements of logical probability which generally receive most attention from writers on probability are the ‘numerical equalities’. Moreover, the greater and less generality among statements of logical probability is shown. Furthermore, the chapter deals with the commonness of statements of logical probability, ‘initial’ logical probabilities and ‘regularity’, and the non-factual character of statements of logical probability. It also considers the logical probability and inductive inference.

Keywords: logical probability; inductive inference; factual probability; numerical equalities; statements; principles

Chapter.  8021 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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