Chapter

Its Further Interpretation and Generalization

D. C. STOVE

in Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism

Published in print April 1973 | ISBN: 9780198245018
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680823 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.003.0005
Its Further Interpretation and Generalization

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This chapter reviews the further interpretation and generalization of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. It first introduces the nature of Hume's predictive-inductive scepticism. It also addresses the sceptical content of the statement of logical probability. In addition, Hume's first suppressed premiss as a statement of logical probability is shown. The fallibilist consequence as a statement of logical probability, and the deductivist premiss as a statement of logical probability are covered. The chapter then outlines the generalization of the sceptical conclusion and fallibilist consequence, and the essence of Hume's argument for general inductive scepticism.

Keywords: David Hume; Hume's argument; inductive scepticism; logical probability; suppressed premisses; fallibilist; deductivist premisses

Chapter.  3670 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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