Chapter

The Falsity of its Deductivist Premiss

D. C. STOVE

in Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism

Published in print April 1973 | ISBN: 9780198245018
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680823 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.003.0007
The Falsity of its Deductivist Premiss

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This chapter covers the falsity of its deductivist premiss. Deductivism is one of the premisses, and, in this chapter, it tries to show that it is false. The chapter also illustrates that the currency of deductivism is deep, wide, and long. The arguments for deductivism are then reported. In addition, the chapter presents some arguments against deductivism. The nature of the deductivist thesis and its specific content impose restrictions on the range of possible arguments for it. They similarly impose restrictions on the range of possible arguments against it.

Keywords: deductivist premiss; deductivism; falsity; arguments; deductivist thesis

Chapter.  6410 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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