The Truth and Importance of its Fallibilist Consequence


in Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism

Published in print April 1973 | ISBN: 9780198245018
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680823 | DOI:
The Truth and Importance of its Fallibilist Consequence

Show Summary Details


This chapter provides a discussion on the truth and the importance of the fallibilist consequence of Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. It starts by addressing the independence of inductive scepticism and inductive fallibilism. It also explains the currency and importance of inductive fallibilism. It seems at present as though inductive fallibilism has been absorbed into the thought of educated men for good. If this really is so, then there is indeed one sense in which inductive fallibilism has become, or is becoming, trivial: the sense in which any very general, simple, logico-philosophical truth, once perceived as true by all educated men, is trivial. Inductive fallibilism is needed as a standing reminder that even if predictive-inductive inferences are more conclusive than Hume's inductive scepticism says they are, still they are less conclusive.

Keywords: fallibilist consequence; Hume's argument; inductive scepticism; inductive fallibilism; predictive-inductive inferences

Chapter.  3383 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.