Chapter

Connection of Judgements

Ross Harrison

in On What There Must Be

Published in print September 1974 | ISBN: 9780198245070
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680830 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245070.003.0003
Connection of Judgements

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This chapter describes the connection of judgements. It first addresses informal argument. As a premiss, it ultimately depends upon assumption and agreement, and the first premiss is introduced and used as an unsupported premiss. It is indicated that a fundamental feature of any comprehensible world is that the protagonist (of that world) should be able to make some distinction between those judgements that he could make which would be true (or apply to the world), and those judgements that he could make which would be false (would not apply to the world). The historical use of the first premiss is reported. Leibniz took his philosophy as resting on two premisses or principles, the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. In addition, immediate deductions from the first premiss, laws, the case where the protagonist is always right, and the alternative premisses are covered.

Keywords: judgements; informal argument; premiss; comprehensible world; Leibniz; protagonist; laws

Chapter.  15734 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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