Chapter

Pleasure

W.F.R. Hardie

in Aristotle's Ethical Theory

Second edition

Published in print January 1980 | ISBN: 9780198246329
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680953 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246329.003.0014
Pleasure

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The EN contains two separate discussions or discourses on pleasure: VII. 11–14 (A) and X. 1–5 (B). Aristotle's own view is indicated in A only by the unelaborated and undefended assertion that pleasure is not to be defined, with the anti-hedonists, as ‘perceived process of becoming’but rather as ‘unimpeded activity’. This definition, unless qualified as it is in B, would imply that happiness could be identified with pleasure, if there are pleasures which are bad, with some particular pleasure. B contains another version of the criticism of Speusippus. The treatment of the metaphysics of pleasure, in particular the argument that pleasure is imperfect because it is a process of movement or becoming, is more elaborate than it was in A.

Keywords: hedonistic; Aristotle; Nicomachean Ethics; Plato; happiness; Speuisippus

Chapter.  9351 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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