Chapter

Aristotelian modality (II)

Sarah Waterlow

in Passage and Possibility

Published in print June 1982 | ISBN: 9780198246565
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191681011 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246565.003.0003
Aristotelian modality (II)

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This chapter deals with two questions not yet considered. First, it looks at the logical relation between the relative temporized conditions (RT-conditions) and their corresponding results that justifies an inference from the former to the latter. This extends to the modal expressions appearing in the results. They express concepts which Aristotle has explained by the claim that their application is determined by the RT-conditions. Unless the results are validated generally from the conditions, the modal concepts in the former embody a fallacy and must be regarded as incoherent. Second, it examines the modal concepts employed in the RT-conditions employed in the conditions themselves. In each condition, there is a reference to‘impossible’ consequences, and to these consequences as ‘following’ or ‘not following’. By ‘following’ Aristotle means a connection such that premises necessarily imply the conclusion.

Keywords: RT-conditions; categorical; following; modal concepts; impossible consequences; RT-results

Chapter.  7034 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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