Chapter

De Interpretatione 9

Sarah Waterlow

in Passage and Possibility

Published in print June 1982 | ISBN: 9780198246565
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191681011 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246565.003.0005
De Interpretatione 9

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Aristotle argues in De Interpretatione 9 that if a certain logical principle is maintained without restriction, one faces the consequence that nothing is contingent — all events happen with a necessity that makes planning and deliberation pointless and leaves no rational basis for one's sense of agency. Furthermore, he notes that a view of oneself must be restricted so as not to apply to certain future-tensed statements about particulars that represent contingencies or lies within the power of the human agent. This chapter suggests that the argument of De Interpretatione 9 turns on two asymmetries. First, contingency belongs only with the future tense. Second, it is consistent with prior truth but not prior falsity.

Keywords: De Interpretatione 9; contingency; agency; human agent; third truth-value

Chapter.  12770 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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