Chapter

The limits of the possible

Sarah Waterlow

in Passage and Possibility

Published in print June 1982 | ISBN: 9780198246565
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191681011 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246565.003.0007
The limits of the possible

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What is possible is subject to certain universal restrictions, and also in each particular case to particular ones. It follows that the present truth of a future-tensed statement doesn't threaten its contingency. When the event is contingent, the prior truth that it would happen cannot diminish its contingency. Some commentators have thought that Aristotle's problem arises from a conflict between the idea that the past is necessary, and that future-tensed statements already have truth value. The account of modality as an actual property of the actual raises a metaphysical problem which one may take as a reason for rejecting it in favour of propositional modality.

Keywords: possible limits; universal restrictions; future-tensed statements; truth-value; actuality; continuity

Chapter.  7243 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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