Chapter

Frankfurt, van Inwagen, and the could-have-acted-otherwise condition

Martha Klein

in Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation

Published in print May 1990 | ISBN: 9780198248347
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191681134 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248347.003.0003

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

Frankfurt, van Inwagen, and the could-have-acted-otherwise condition

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This chapter begins by examining some arguments of Frankfurt's which constitute a powerful case for the claim that there is not an independent C-condition for moral responsibility. It then examines van Inwagen's claim that even if Frankfurt's arguments succeed, it is still true that moral responsibility requires the ability to have acted otherwise. It is argued that van Inwagen fails to establish this.

Keywords: Frankfurt; independent C-condition; moral responsibility; van Inwagen

Chapter.  7397 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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