Chapter

Can the U-condition for blameworthiness be fulfilled?

Martha Klein

in Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation

Published in print May 1990 | ISBN: 9780198248347
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191681134 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248347.003.0006

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

Can the U-condition for blameworthiness be fulfilled?

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This chapter discusses the arguments for two claims: (1) that belief in the U-condition for blameworthiness is logically incoherent; and (2) that the U-condition cannot be fulfilled. The success of arguments for the first claim would constitute a conclusive case for saying that we ought not to be committed to the U-condition. The success of arguments for the second claim would make it reasonable to ask whether we ought to be so committed. It is argued that there is no incoherence in the belief that fulfilment of the U-condition is necessary for blameworthiness, but that the U-condition for blameworthiness cannot be fulfilled.

Keywords: U-condition; blameworthiness; moral responsibility; compatibilism; incompatibilism

Chapter.  23236 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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