It has been established that the U-condition for blameworthiness (probably) cannot be fulfilled. Our commitment to the belief in this condition is a consequence of our commitment to the belief that offenders who are motivated by states for which they are not responsible do not deserve to be blamed. It follows that if and when we blame people for flouting moral requirements we are doing something which is unjust. This chapter then addresses the question of whether we should give up blaming. It argues that to the extent that we have strong moral feelings about certain things, we would continue...

It has been established that the U-condition for blameworthiness (probably) cannot be fulfilled. Our commitment to the belief in this condition is a consequence of our commitment to the belief that offenders who are motivated by states for which they are not responsible do not deserve to be blamed. It follows that if and when we blame people for flouting moral requirements we are doing something which is unjust. This chapter then addresses the question of whether we should give up blaming. It argues that to the extent that we have strong moral feelings about certain things, we would continue to feel intensely even if we fully acknowledged that no one deserved to be blamed or punished.