Chapter

Induction, Rational Acceptance, and Minimally Inconsistent Sets

Keith Lehrer

in Metamind

Published in print June 1990 | ISBN: 9780198248507
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191681141 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248507.003.0005
Induction, Rational Acceptance, and Minimally Inconsistent Sets

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This chapter presents a theory of inductive inference and rational acceptance in scientific enquiry. A concept of relevant deduction is defined as a concept in which the truth of each and every premise of a deductive argument is essential to establishing the truth of the conclusion by deduction from the premises. This definition is based on the completely abstact notion of a minimally inconsistent sets of statements. In terms of this same abstract logical concept and the relation of probability, this chapter designs a concept of inductive inference that is a principle of rationality. This concept of inductive reference is shown to form the basis of a principle of acceptance in which two important epistemic utilities are maximised.

Keywords: inductive inference; rational acceptance; relevant deduction; inductive rule; induction; explanation

Chapter.  12229 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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