Chapter

Reason and Consistency

Keith Lehrer

in Metamind

Published in print June 1990 | ISBN: 9780198248507
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191681141 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248507.003.0007
Reason and Consistency

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It may be reasonable for a person to accept each statement in an inconsistent set because it is reasonable, though incorrect, for him to think the set of statements is consistent. Moreover, it may even be reasonable for a person to accept a set of statements he is certain is inconsistent. A person who has discovered that he accepts an inconsistent set of statements may reasonably continue to do so when, for lack of time or insignt, he sees no satisfactory way of extricating himself. Such reflections put consistency in a better light than is customary. The conviction remains: there is something unreasonable about inconsistency. The question is when inconsistency is unreasonable and why it is so, what possibly caused it.

Keywords: consistency; reason; inconsistency; acceptance; ideal rationality; paradox; minimax; risk; expected value; personal preference

Chapter.  7434 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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