Chapter

From Objectivity to Ontology

Edward M. Hundert

in Philosophy Psychiatry and Neuroscience

Published in print November 1990 | ISBN: 9780198248965
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191681165 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248965.003.0003

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

From Objectivity to Ontology

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This chapter shows Hegel's criticism of Kant's metaphysical world as being ‘merely objective’. Hegel's critique of Kant's view of knowledge is simply that it is self-refuting. To this self-refuting view, Hegel proposes a solution which eliminates the gulf between things-as-we-know-them and things-in-themselves. Hegel is acutely aware that the relationship between the ‘moment of knowledge’ and the ‘moment of truth’ is not always that of identity. The great irony contained in Kant's conception of the relationship between ‘thoughts’ and ‘things’ is that he seemed so much more interested in the contribution of thoughts to things. While Kant put forth the (self-refuting) view that reality is ‘relative to’ consciousness, Hegel replaces this with the ultimately unobjectionable view that reason is relative to reality.

Keywords: Hegel; metaphysical world; self-refuting view; knowledge; truth

Chapter.  11273 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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