Phenomenology: The General Question

Galen Strawson

in Selves

Published in print July 2009 | ISBN: 9780198250067
Published online September 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780191712593 | DOI:
 Phenomenology: The General Question

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This chapter defends the proposal about the minimal case of genuine self-experience made Chapter 2 and drawn on in Chapter 3. It argues that any genuine form of self-experience must involve some sense or conception of the self as a subject of experience that is a single mental thing, in a sense that requires further characterization, but need not involve anything more. The chapter considers expressions like ‘conception of the self’ and ‘sense of the self’ to be similar to ‘self-experience’, in that they do not imply that there are any such things as selves.

Keywords: self-experience; Whittling Argument; mental; distinct; single; personality; agent; persisting; self-consciousness

Chapter.  30489 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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