Chapter

Metaphysics: The Question of Fact, 1

Galen Strawson

in Selves

Published in print July 2009 | ISBN: 9780198250067
Published online September 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780191712593 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250067.003.0007
 Metaphysics: The Question of Fact, 1

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter begins with a discussion of the thin conception, according to which a subject of experience is something that exists only if experience exists of which it is the subject. It explores Descartes' endorsement of the thin conception of the subject, which is fundamental to his conception of the I or mind or soul or self or subject in that it doesn't and can't exist in the absence of experience or consciousness — in his terminology — ‘thinking’ or ‘thought’ (cogitatio). The chapter then considers Fichte, Husserl, Nozick, James, and Hume.

Keywords: thin subjects; I; Descartes; Fichte; Husserl; Nozick; James; Hume

Chapter.  19707 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.