Chapter

Knowledge, Volitional Agency, and Causation in Malebranche and Geulincx

Steven Nadler

in Occasionalism

Published in print December 2010 | ISBN: 9780198250081
Published online January 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191712586 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.003.0006
Knowledge, Volitional Agency, and Causation in Malebranche and Geulincx

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Some occasionalists argue that there is an epistemic or cognitive condition for causality, whereby in order to count as the cause of an effect one must know how to bring that effect about. Finite minds do not have the knowledge necessary to move bodies, the argument runs; only God, as an omniscient mind, can adequately fulfill this condition. This unusual epistemic condition for causal power appears primarily in the arguments of Malebranche and Geulincx, which are examined in this chapter.

Keywords: cause; knowledge; Malebranche; Geulincx; occasionalism; God; mind; body

Chapter.  5761 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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