Chapter

Introduction

John Bricke

in Mind and Morality

Published in print March 2000 | ISBN: 9780198250111
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191681240 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250111.003.0001
Introduction

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Absence of agreement on the most fundamental questions concerning the interpretation of David Hume's views on mind and morality complements an utter absence of agreement as to the soundness of his views, and as to the cogency — and even the aptness — of the arguments he musters in their support. This book explores Hume's efforts to found a theory of morality on a theory of mind. Hume's finished theory of mind and morality — his expanded moral conativism — will emerge from reflection on the character of reasons for action; on the interrelations of the primitive notions of desire, volition, and affection; and on the inadequacies of moral cognitivism. Its key conception is that of specifically moral desires, desires whose careful characterization contributes to Hume's elaboration of a general theory of moral sentiments; of a complex account of the connections between morality, justice, and convention; and of a theory of specifically moral agents.

Keywords: David Hume; mind; morality; moral conativism; action; desire; justice; convention; moral agents; affection

Chapter.  1352 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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