Moral Sentiments

John Bricke

in Mind and Morality

Published in print March 2000 | ISBN: 9780198250111
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191681240 | DOI:
Moral Sentiments

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David Hume's direct and indirect arguments constitute a sustained, sophisticated, and compelling attack on standard moral cognitivism and its many variants. With moral conativism as his foundation, Hume must find ways to incorporate a consonant treatment of those moral ‘judgements’ and ‘opinions’ that moral conativism does not itself touch, moral ‘judgements’ and ‘opinions’ that, not being practical in the intended sense, are not to be identified with moral desires. Sympathy's correction introduces the universality and impartiality, and thus the intersubjectivity, of moral desires. Attention to the two elements in Hume's explanatory account — attention both to sympathy and to its correction — will help confirm that the analysis this chapter offers of moral desires is Hume's. This chapter also discusses Hume's views on moral affections and moral language.

Keywords: David Hume; moral conativism; moral judgements; moral desires; sympathy; impartiality; intersubjectivity; moral affections; moral language

Chapter.  28264 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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