From Moral Desire to Convention

John Bricke

in Mind and Morality

Published in print March 2000 | ISBN: 9780198250111
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191681240 | DOI:
From Moral Desire to Convention

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Specifically moral desires, just as the partial desires of which they are impartial variants, are person-implicating: their contents make essential reference to the actions and qualities of human persons. More narrowly, they are mind-implicating: their contents make essential reference to the mind-displaying actions and qualities — the conative characteristics, the traits, the intellectual talents and abilities — of such individuals. Some moral desires are desire-implicating desires. Within the framework of David Hume's expanded moral conativism, it follows that some propositional moral affections are likewise desire-implicating ones. In his Artificiality Argument, Hume contends that desire-implicating moral desires implicate natural — that is to say, non-moral — desires. He also distinguishes two types of desire-implicating moral desires. Moral desires of one of these types implicate natural non-moral desires, desires that do not require conventions. Moral desires of the other of these types implicate artificial non-moral desires, desires that require the presence of conventions.

Keywords: David Hume; moral desires; moral conativism; Artificiality Argument; moral affections; conventions; non-moral desires; actions; desire-implicating desires

Chapter.  11706 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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