Value Judgements and Normative Claims


in The Ideal of a Rational Morality

Published in print January 2003 | ISBN: 9780198250210
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191681264 | DOI:
Value Judgements and                         Normative Claims

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This chapter proposes the use of the term ‘normative claims’, to cover both value judgements and moral judgements. A normative claim is a claim to the effect that some standard ought to prevail, a claim about what ought to be done or would be good if it were. In sociological usage, a normative claim is one about norms, and in this sense a norm is a standard, in the sense of average or usual or normal, which does exist among a certain group; in this sense a normative claim is a statistical measure. This is not the philosophical use of ‘normative’. A normative claim is one about what standard ought to be followed, as distinct from what is normal, standard, or average. The distinction just presented presupposes a distinction between statements of fact and judgements of value, sometimes called the ‘fact/value’ distinction; sometimes the ‘is/ought’ distinction. This is explained by saying something about other kinds of statements. The chapter presents an account that is fairly standard if not canonical; and later shows reason to question some of its claims.

Keywords: value behaviour; value judgements; normative claims; moral judgements

Chapter.  14197 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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