Chapter

States and the Type-Token Distinction

Helen Steward

in The Ontology of Mind

Published in print March 2000 | ISBN: 9780198250647
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191681318 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250647.003.0005

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

States and the Type-Token Distinction

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This chapter attempts to explain how we come by the nouns and nominal phrases which suggest reference to states, before going on to argue that the idea that events and states are close relations in the same ontological family — an idea present either explicitly or implicitly in the writings of many philosophers — has been a huge and serious mistake. It suggests, in particular, that the concept of a token state has been widely misunderstood and that the sorts of stative nominals which are sometimes alleged to refer to these entities are usually best understood as nominalizations of whole sentences, and as expressions, therefore, which refer to facts rather than to particulars.

Keywords: states; properties; philosophy of mind; stative nominal; normalization

Chapter.  13030 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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