Chapter

The Denial of the Duality of Is and Ought

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print March 1991 | ISBN: 9780198252177
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191681363 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0017
The Denial of the Duality of Is and Ought

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In spite of the incontrovertible difference between Is and Ought, there have been attempts, and still are attempts — most recently in connection with the question of the applicability of logical principles to norms — to deny directly or indirectly the duality of Is and Ought: for instance, claims that an Is is implicit in an Ought, or an Ought in an Is, or that Is is founded on an Ought, or Ought on an Is, or that a certain Ought is connected with a certain Is in such a way that one of the two is ‘correlated with’ or ‘co-ordinated with’ or ‘parallel to’ the other, or can be ‘translated’ into the other.

Keywords: Is; Ought; duality; logical principle; norms; correlation

Chapter.  8068 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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