Chapter

Is and Ought in Kant's Philosophy

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print March 1991 | ISBN: 9780198252177
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191681363 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0018
Is and Ought in Kant's Philosophy

Show Summary Details

Preview

No duality of Is and Ought can be found in Kant's philosophy for the very simple reason that, for Kant, the moral norm (the moral Ought, the moral law) emanates from reason in its function as practical reason, the very same reason whose function it is to know what is. For Kant says explicitly in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals that practical reason, the moral legislator, is fundamentally the same as theoretical reason: ‘I require of a critical examination of a pure practical reason, if it is to be complete, that its unity with the speculative be subject to presentation under a common principle, because in the final analysis there can be but one and the same reason which must be differentiated only in application’.

Keywords: Is; Ought; duality; Kant; moral norms; practical reason; human behaviour

Chapter.  1878 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.