Chapter

Law as a Standard of Value and Law as ‘Teaching’—The Significance of the Judge's Finding of Fact

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print March 1991 | ISBN: 9780198252177
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191681363 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0030
Law as a Standard of Value and Law as ‘Teaching’—The Significance of the Judge's Finding of Fact

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When a norm decrees behaviour to be obligatory, the actual behaviour which agrees with the norm can be judged (i.e. evaluated) as valuable or good, and the behaviour which does not agree with the norm as ‘disvaluable’ or bad. As was indicated previously, this norm institutes a value, if we mean by ‘value’ agreement with a norm and by ‘disvalue’ failure to agree with a norm. When a certain behaviour is objectively — i.e. purely cognitively — asserted to agree or not with a norm presupposed to be valid (and in this sense is evaluated), the norm serves as a standard of value. To that extent, ‘serving-as-a-standard-of-value’ can be called a function of a norm. But it should be noted that this ‘evaluation’ is an act of judgment and not directly a function of the norm itself, which is simply presupposed in the value-judgment.

Keywords: norm; standard of value; value-judgment; behaviour; fact finding; teaching

Chapter.  1586 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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