Chapter

Thinking and Willing: Their Inter-relationship

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print March 1991 | ISBN: 9780198252177
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191681363 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0042
Thinking and Willing: Their Inter-relationship

More Like This

Show all results sharing this subject:

  • Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

GO

Show Summary Details

Preview

Thinking and willing are indeed two different functions, but they can be connected. This is possible in different ways. One can make a statement (in the sense of the expression of the meaning of an act of thought) with the intention of thereby bringing about a certain behaviour of the person to whom it is addressed. For example, a mother says to her child: ‘If you touch the red-hot stove-plate, you will burn yourself and it will be very painful.’ She makes this statement with the intention of bringing it about that the child refrains from touching the red-hot stove-plate. Or she says to the child: ‘If you take this medicine, it will taste good.’ She makes this statement with the intention of thereby bringing it about that the child takes the medicine.

Keywords: thinking and willing; human behaviour; intention; act of thought; act of will; linguistic expression

Chapter.  1072 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.