Chapter

The Being-True of a Statement and the Being-Good of Behaviour

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print March 1991 | ISBN: 9780198252177
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191681363 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0045
The Being-True of a Statement and the Being-Good of Behaviour

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‘True’ and ‘good’ are indeed both properties. Behaviour is ‘good’ if it agrees with a norm prescribing this behaviour. ‘Good’ is a value, a moral or legal value, according to whether it is a moral or a legal norm which institutes this value. If we also conceive of truth as a ‘value’, as a logical or theoretical value (as opposed to a moral or legal value which is a practical value), we might believe that the desired parallel or analogy between a statement and a norm can be justified by the claim that both are related in some way to values. But this is not possible: there is no parallel or analogy between the being-true of a statement and the being-good of behaviour, between the judgment that a statement is true and the judgment that behaviour is morally or legally good.

Keywords: being-true; being-good; behaviour; legal value; moral value; judgment

Chapter.  2309 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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