Chapter

The Problem of the Applicability of Logical Principles to Norms

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print March 1991 | ISBN: 9780198252177
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191681363 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0050
The Problem of the Applicability of Logical Principles to Norms

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This chapter is concerned with the question of whether certain principles of so-called bivalent (true–false) logic, specifically the principle of contradiction and the rules of inference, are applicable to norms of morality and law. That they are applicable to norms of positive law has been almost universally assumed in traditional legal theory. The question is not whether these principles are in fact applied to norms — and to legal norms in particular — or whether their application is desirable or not from the point of view of legal politics. These questions have been the object of much debate in legal literature, on the assumption — considered to be obvious — that the principles are applicable.

Keywords: true–false logic; logical principles; morality; legal norms; legal theory; legal politics

Chapter.  2205 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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