Chapter

Dubislav's Theory of the ‘Recasting’ of Requirement-sentences into Assertion-sentences

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print March 1991 | ISBN: 9780198252177
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191681363 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0054
Dubislav's Theory of the ‘Recasting’ of Requirement-sentences into Assertion-sentences

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Jorgensen partly follows Walter Dubislav (1937), who examined the question of the applicability of the rule of inference to requirement-sentences (i.e. to norms), and especially the question of inferences from the validity of a general norm to that of an individual norm. Dubislav asserts that no imperative is possible without an imperator, that an imperative without an imperator is an ‘impossible concept’, and that there is a fundamental difference between assertion-sentences and requirement-sentences, namely that requirement-sentences are not subject to the true-false alternative. Hence the logical rule of inference is not applicable to requirement-sentences.

Keywords: Dubislav's theory; requirement-sentence; assertion-sentence; Walter Dubislav; rule of inference; individual norm

Chapter.  1357 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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