Chapter

Hofstadter and McKinsey's Theory of the Analogy between the Satisfaction of an Imperative and the Truth of a Sentence; Alf Ross's Theory of the Parallel between the Observance-value of an Imperative and the Truth-value of a Statement

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print March 1991 | ISBN: 9780198252177
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191681363 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0055
Hofstadter and McKinsey's Theory of the Analogy between the Satisfaction of an Imperative and the Truth of a Sentence; Alf Ross's Theory of the Parallel between the Observance-value of an Imperative and the Truth-value of a Statement

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An imperative is satisfied if it is actually complied with, if there occurs behaviour which agrees with the imperative. The statement that this agreement obtains is what Dubislav called the assertion-sentence belonging to the requirement-sentence. Ross believes ‘that there is a complete parallelism between the satisfaction value of the I-sentences and the truth value of the S-sentences’. And he declares: ‘Accordingly, to infer one imperative from another means to say something about a necessary connection between the satisfaction of the imperatives in question’. That is incorrect. For there is no analogy or parallel between the ‘observance-value’ of an imperative or norm and the ‘truth-value’ of a statement.

Keywords: truth of a sentence; imperative; assertion-sentence; requirement-sentence; Alf Ross's theory; observance-value

Chapter.  444 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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