Chapter

Logical Problems about Grounding the Validity of Norms

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print March 1991 | ISBN: 9780198252177
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191681363 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0059
Logical Problems about Grounding the Validity of Norms

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The validity of a general norm and that of an individual norm can be represented in a syllogism in another way. In order to do so, one must begin by accepting that it is not the meaning of every act of will about the behaviour of another person which is a norm, but that a norm (i.e. an Ought binding on the addressee) exists only if the subjective meaning of the act of will about the behaviour of another person is also its objective meaning. That is the difference between the command of a highwayman and the command of a legal organ. The subjective meaning of an act of will about the behaviour of another person is also its objective meaning (and that means, is a valid, binding norm) if this act is empowered by a valid norm of a positive moral or legal order.

Keywords: norm validity; individual norm; general norm; behaviour; objective meaning; subjective meaning; act of will

Chapter.  6429 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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