Chapter

Promises and Other Sources of Obligation

P. S. Atiyah

in Promises, Morals, and Law

Published in print January 1983 | ISBN: 9780198254799
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191681530 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198254799.003.0007
Promises and Other Sources of Obligation

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This chapter analyses the relationship between the three sources of obligations. The author suggests that consent is a broader and perhaps a more basic source of obligation. Consent is in particular a more extensive factor in discharging the existence of obligations than in their creation; but the denial or discharge of one obligation often entails the recognition or creation of others. Another way of expressing consent is to make an admission where it is argued that a very common justification for treating a promise as binding is that the promise is evidence, or an admission, of the existence of some other obligation already owed by the promisor. It is also pointed out that that the bare expectations created by executory mutual promises, although creating obligations, are often not well protected by law.

Keywords: sources of obligations; consent; admission; executory mutual promises

Chapter.  17681 words. 

Subjects: Civil Law

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