Chapter

Criminal Justice after Kant

ALAN NORRIE

in Punishment, Responsibility, and Justice

Published in print October 2000 | ISBN: 9780198259565
Published online January 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191710636 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198259565.003.0001

Series: Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law and Justice

Criminal Justice after Kant

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It is necessary to understand Immanuel Kant and Kantianism and to move beyond them in a way that modern criminal justice thinking fails to do. This introductory chapter discusses the core ideas of a Kantian orthodox subjectivism, and then develops some objections to what constitutes its main problem, its individualist moral basis. Three main themes are examined: the ways in which Kantian individualism produces endemic false separation between an abstract conception of the individual and the broader social and moral context of his/her actions, and the effect of so doing; second, the inadequacy of an analytical model of legal reasoning to deal with the real character of individual agency, and the need for an alternative dialectical approach; and, third, the need to retrieve and defend what remains of moral value in Kantian individualism, and how this can be appreciated within a relational approach.

Keywords: criminal justice; Kantianism; Immanuel Kant; orthodox subjectivism; individualism; legal reasoning; moral value; false separations

Chapter.  8176 words. 

Subjects: Comparative Law

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