Chapter

Constructing the Heresy

William Lucy

in Understanding and Explaining Adjudication

Published in print September 1999 | ISBN: 9780198260257
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191682070 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198260257.003.0014
Constructing the Heresy

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For many heretics, the rational reconstruction of judicial decisions is not an intellectually viable option, since they believe that adjudication cannot be rational in the first place. There is a more radical heretical response to law and legal scholarship which is also echoed in the new art history. Both orthodox doctrinal scholarship and legal philosophy unite behind the banner of sympathetic, rational reconstruction. It is a style of scholarship that is neither fawningly quiescent nor sceptically dismissive towards the existing legal system and its doctrines. Whereas the jurisprudential and doctrinal orthodoxy explicitly invokes the internal point of view — from which is derived a commitment to consistency, coherence, and rational reconstruction — the heresy explicitly or implicitly rejects that method. The initial step for the heretic is to loosen the hold of the Verstehen method, and the commitment to consistency, coherence, and rational reconstruction the orthodox think it yields over legal thought.

Keywords: heresy; rational reconstruction; judicial decisions; adjudication; art history; legal philosophy; orthodoxy; legal thought; coherence; Verstehen method

Chapter.  30418 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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