Chapter

Subjectivism II: Character and Action

R. A. Duff

in Criminal Attempts

Published in print January 1997 | ISBN: 9780198262688
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191682384 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198262688.003.0007

Series: Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law and Justice

Subjectivism II: Character and Action

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This chapter examines a subjectivist argument that liability in criminal attempts should be determined by character rather than choice. A character conception expresses a significant truth about who can be held criminally liable. This argument suggests that only moral agents whose actions exhibit the structure of thought, attitude, and motivation should he held liable. This chapter compares that character argument with its choice counterpart, and the subjective with the objective argument.

Keywords: character; criminal attempts; criminal liability; subjectivism; attitude; motivation; criminal law

Chapter.  9686 words. 

Subjects: Criminal Law

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