Chapter

Action, Intention, and Responsibility

R. A. Duff

in Criminal Attempts

Published in print January 1997 | ISBN: 9780198262688
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191682384 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198262688.003.0011

Series: Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law and Justice

Action, Intention, and Responsibility

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This chapter discusses a different account of action related to the determination of liability in criminal attempts that rejects the objectivist and subjectivist accounts and some of their assumptions. This account involves intention, action, and responsibility and disagrees with the reductivist definition of action. This chapter explains the relevant concepts of voluntary and involuntary actions, the act requirement, the action principle, non-intended agency, and intentions and reasons.

Keywords: action; criminal liability; criminal attempts; objectivism; subjectivism; reductivism; action principle; act requirement

Chapter.  17239 words. 

Subjects: Criminal Law

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