Chapter

Duties of Disclosure and French Contract Law: Contribution To an Economic Analysis

Muriel Fabre-magnan

in Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law

Published in print August 1997 | ISBN: 9780198265788
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191682964 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265788.003.0004
Duties of Disclosure and French Contract Law: Contribution To an Economic Analysis

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This chapter investigates the economic analysis which is usually made of pre-contractual duties of disclosure, and the widely accepted conclusion that such duties are economically inefficient. Some of the distinctions made under French contract law are used to show that, in some circumstances, imposing such a duty may be more efficient than relying on each party to safeguard his own interests. This is not to say that French law is beyond criticism in this area, however, and the chapter will also use economic analysis to show that in some respects French law goes too far.

Keywords: French law; economic analysis; disclosure; pre-contractual duties

Chapter.  11460 words. 

Subjects: Civil Law

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