Chapter

The Government as Body Politic

Peter Trepte

in Regulating Procurement

Published in print December 2004 | ISBN: 9780198267751
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191683350 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198267751.003.0003
The Government as Body Politic

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Market and institutional failures leading to conditions of imperfect competition which negatively affect economic efficiency (Pareto efficiency) explain many of the provisions which are common to most procurement systems. This chapter addresses a further concern of welfare economics which considers the normative value judgements made by governments and their effect on issues of allocative efficiency. Whilst it is expected that the value choices made by the government would remain Pareto efficient (that is, would fall within one of the many Pareto-efficient options), it is also the responsibility of governments to decide (based on their election promises) which Pareto-efficient option to choose. That is not always achievable and, where it is not, there will be a trade-off between the attainment of a non-economic policy objective and economic efficiency. The success of procurement regulation will be measured by its ability to satisfy the requirements of the context in which it operates. This chapter also discusses the instrumental use of procurement, protective policies and proactive policies, strategic policies, non-discrimination, statutory compliance, and contract compliance.

Keywords: Pareto efficiency; economic efficiency; welfare economics; value judgements; governments; allocative efficiency; protective policies; non-discrimination; contract compliance; procurement regulation

Chapter.  39073 words. 

Subjects: Constitutional and Administrative Law

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