This chapter examines the rules of evidence governing the admissibility of expert evidence in criminal trials, focusing on the ways in which English evidence law does, or might, set reliability standards for the scientific techniques that form the basis of expert testimony in the courts. It argues that English law should construct a reliability-based exclusionary rule for expert evidence. It also presents admissibility rules in other countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and United States. It explores the broad differences between the English and American Law, suggesting that at...

This chapter examines the rules of evidence governing the admissibility of expert evidence in criminal trials, focusing on the ways in which English evidence law does, or might, set reliability standards for the scientific techniques that form the basis of expert testimony in the courts. It argues that English law should construct a reliability-based exclusionary rule for expert evidence. It also presents admissibility rules in other countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and United States. It explores the broad differences between the English and American Law, suggesting that at least for criminal cases, Daubert is a useful tool for examining the reliability of expert evidence. It sets the stage for an evaluation of the general justifications for exclusionary rules. It presents the logic of exclusionary rules and the justification of the exclusion of expert evidence.