Authority and Reason

Jules Coleman

in The Autonomy of Law

Published in print June 1999 | ISBN: 9780198267904
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191683404 | DOI:
Authority and Reason

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This chapter attempts to revisit the relationship between incorporationism and the rule of recognition. In doing so, the chapter reviews various accounts of normative force or authority and outlines an alternative account of the rule of recognition in such a way that it emphasizes the fact that the rule of recognition is a convergent social practice among officials. The chapter also offers an outline of the general account of the authority of rules subordinate to the rule of recognition. Finally, the chapter also suggests an argument for imposing constraints on legal authority that operates on the claim that legal authority must respect the norms of autonomy and equality implicit in the social practice of giving reasons. Legal positivism is described in the chapter as having two basic tenets: the rule of recognition and the separability thesis.

Keywords: rule of recognition; separability thesis; incorporationism; legal authority; autonomy; equality

Chapter.  13283 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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