Chapter

Conclusion

Neil Duxbury

in Random Justice

Published in print July 1999 | ISBN: 9780198268253
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191683466 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268253.003.0007
Conclusion

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This book has illustrated the advantages and drawbacks of chance and randomized social decision-making, claiming that arguments concerning such decision-making more often than not require qualification. Detailed scrutiny of randomized legal decision-making compels us to confront difficult, sometimes uncomfortable, questions concerning the role of reason in law and how we conceptualize justice. Although we are often understandably wary of resorting to lotteries to determine outcomes of legal significance, the idea that randomization might be employed more extensively within legal decision-making contexts ought not to be dismissed cursorily. Rigid application of some particular decision-making criterion to settle disputes might render adjudication less fraught with complexity and ambiguity. Depending on the criterion used, such application might even make the process of adjudication less partial. If the criterion is easy to apply, moreover, the costs of decision-making are likely to be reduced. One criterion which offers all of these qualities is random selection.

Keywords: social decision-making; randomization; lotteries; justice; adjudication; random selection; reason; law; chance

Chapter.  578 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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