in The Moral Gap

Published in print May 1997 | ISBN: 9780198269571
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191683701 | DOI:

Series: Oxford Studies in Theological Ethics


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This chapter argues against the so-called strength of desire principle and its relation to the issue of moral demand. This principle proposes that people can satisfy the requirement of justice by giving initial preference in moral decision to the stronger of two desires. This chapter raises an objection to this principle on the grounds that it cannot account for the importance given to the centrality of a desire in a person’s life. It suggests that most current answers to objections about the strength of desire principle failed to recognize what Immanuel Kant called the propensity to evil.

Keywords: strength of desire principle; moral demand; moral decision; justice; propensity to evil; Immanuel Kant

Chapter.  11911 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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