Beyond the Naturalistic Fallacy: The Rediscovery of Aquinas

Anthony J. Lisska

in Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law

Published in print November 1997 | ISBN: 9780198269670
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191683732 | DOI:
Beyond the Naturalistic Fallacy: The Rediscovery of Aquinas

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This chapter aims to undertake an explication of the structural philosophy on moral theory in analytic philosophy with emphasis on Thomas Aquinas' natural law ethic of self-actualization. It discusses David Hume’s arguments on fact/value distinction and analyses G. E. Moore’s use of Hume’s distinction by means of the naturalistic fallacy argument and the intuitionist theory Moore developed in Principia Ethica. This chapter also considers the kinds of questions natural law theory might respond to in working out a consistent ethical naturalism.

Keywords: moral theory; structural philosophy; Thomas Aquinas; natural law; intuitionist theory; self-actualization; David Hume; G.E. Moore; naturalistic fallacy argument; Principia Ethica

Chapter.  9812 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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