Chapter

The Veatch Rejoinder: Ontological Foundationalism

Anthony J. Lisska

in Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law

Published in print November 1997 | ISBN: 9780198269670
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191683732 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.003.0007
The Veatch Rejoinder: Ontological Foundationalism

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This chapter examines the concepts central to the moral theory of philosopher Henry Veatch. It reveals that Veatch has adopted a metaphysical realism structurally similar to that of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas as the ontological foundation of his naturalist meta-physics. It explains the concepts used by Veatch as presuppositions and analyses how his method differs from much contemporary philosophical activity in analytical ethical theory. This chapter also compares Veatch’s metaphilosophy with that of John Finnis.

Keywords: moral theory; Henry Veatch; metaphysical realism; Aristotle; Thomas Aquinas; metaphilosophy; John Finnis; naturalist meta-physics; ethical theory

Chapter.  8014 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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