Chapter

A Better Virtue Epistemology Further Developed

Ernest Sosa

in Judgment and Agency

Published in print April 2015 | ISBN: 9780198719694
Published online April 2015 | e-ISBN: 9780191788765 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.003.0004
A Better Virtue Epistemology Further Developed

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This chapter first integrates degrees of confidence with the account offered in the preceding chapter, and then considers two forms of representation, the functional and the judgmental. Both forms of representation fall under our AAA account of performance normativity, since they both are performances with a constitutive truth-aim. One of them does so through our animal teleology, the other through our rational capacities, such as our judgmental competence. The last subsection, “A Theory of Competence,” contains a theory of competence aimed to fit our virtue epistemology, with two central notions: that of the apt alethic affirmation (aimed at truth), whose correctness manifests the pertinent epistemic competence of the believer, and that of the fully apt affirmation, one aimed at aptness and aptly guided to it.

Keywords: functional representation; apt belief; confidence; credence; competence

Chapter.  7296 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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