Chapter

Contractualism and the Conditional Fallacy

Jussi Suikkanen

in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 4

Published in print December 2014 | ISBN: 9780198722144
Published online January 2015 | e-ISBN: 9780191789236 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722144.003.0006

Series: Oxford Studies In Normative Ethics

Contractualism and the Conditional Fallacy

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Most contractualist ethical theories have a subjunctivist structure. This means that they attempt to make sense of right and wrong in terms of a set of principles which would be accepted in some idealized, non-actual circumstances. This makes these views vulnerable to the so-called conditional fallacy objection. The moral principles that are appropriate for the idealized circumstances fail to give a correct account of what is right and wrong in the ordinary situations. This chapter uses two versions of contractualism to illustrate this problem: Nicholas Southwood’s and a standard contractualist theory inspired by T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism. It then develops a version of Scanlon’s view that can avoid the problem. This solution is based on the idea that we also need to compare different inculcation elements of moral codes in the contractualist framework. This idea also provides a new solution to the problem of at what level of social acceptance should principles be compared.

Keywords: contractualism; conditional fallacy; Southwood; Scanlon; moral inculcation; subjunctivism; permissibility; social acceptance

Chapter.  9795 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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